{"id":3420,"date":"2016-10-16T19:10:10","date_gmt":"2016-10-16T23:10:10","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/ss.sites.mtu.edu\/mhugl\/?p=3420"},"modified":"2016-12-06T16:37:38","modified_gmt":"2016-12-06T21:37:38","slug":"germfask-mi-m47-patton","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ss.sites.mtu.edu\/mhugl\/2016\/10\/16\/germfask-mi-m47-patton\/","title":{"rendered":"Germfask MI, M47 Patton"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"Germfask's<\/a><\/p>\n

In Germfask Michigan there is a tank on the side of the road.\u00a0 It is part of a monument in honor of Edward James Doran who served in WWII.\u00a0 The tank itself is a M47 Patton, which was designed for the Korean War.<\/p>\n

History of M47<\/strong><\/p>\n

The M47 Patton was the result of severe time pressure on the U.S. Army to develop a competitive armored vehicle.\u00a0 Before the Korean War no tanks were in production, and the factories for World War II models had been converted back to civilan purposed long ago. \u00a0In addition, the Army was in the process of converting 800 M26 Pershing tanks to M46 Pattons [9].\u00a0 Not only did America not have tanks in production, but there was also a shortage of modern tanks available to the armed forces with the majority being M4 Shermans and M26 Pershings.\u00a0 Based on this, the War Department Equipment Board recommended that new tanks be developed in May 1946.\u00a0 This recommendation led to the start of development on several new tanks; however, progress was slow as the army was demobilizing in the years after WWII. \u00a0According to Cameron, \u201cthe outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 added urgency to the Advisory Panel’s recommendations. Not only did the war catch the Army unprepared, the fear that it might become a global conflict highlighted the U.S. tank fleet’s weaknesses, both in numbers and quality\u201d [5].<\/p>\n

In order to meet the sudden demand for a new tank the Army had two options:\u00a0 One of these was to put WWII models back into production.\u00a0 This had the advantage of using well tested and understood designs; however, these tank models were very outdated and thus under armed and armored.\u00a0 The other option was to use a new design; but none of the designs in development were tested or standardized. \u00a0Since both options would require the U.S. industrial base to retool for new production, the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army decided to run the risk of producing the new tank models with out fully testing them and deal with issues in production [9].\u00a0 This decision was spurred by the fact that the Army needed a new tank as soon as possible and did not want to wait the years it could take to finish designing and testing a new tank.\u00a0 \u201cSince Speed was essential and the designing of the T42\u2019s turret had been finished, it was deemed expedient to join the T42 turret to what basically had been the M46 hull\u201d [1]. \u00a0This combination is what became the M47 Patton.\u00a0 The new tank retained most of the speed and maneuverability of the M46, while mounting a much more effective gun.\u00a0 However, the Tank was not without its flaws.\u00a0 Among them, its range finder was difficult to use and the tank had severely limited range of only 85 miles.\u00a0 These problems, among other teething issues hampered its deployment in the Korean War and made it a less desirable vehicle.\u00a0 This was acceptable however as, the M47 was intended only as a stopgap measure until a superior medium tank design could be developed. \u00a0Development of this replacement vehicle began in October 1950, before the first M47’s were delivered [5]. \u00a0Despite this, over 9000 M47 tanks were built, with most being exported.<\/p>\n

Evolution of tank design from WWII to Korea<\/strong><\/p>\n

At the end of the second world war the United States had three main tanks: The M24 Chaffee light tank, the M4 Sherman medium tank, and the M26 Pershing heavy tank.\u00a0 In the post war period these tanks were not considered to be ideal.\u00a0 According to Cameron, the M24 while well liked was under-armed with its main gun having little anti-tank capability [4].\u00a0 The M4 Sherman, the most common American tank of the war was under-armed and under-armored.\u00a0 The M26 while well-armed and armored was under-powered.\u00a0 The groundwork for the development of the M26 began in 1943 due to questions about the armament of the M4.\u00a0 This started discussions about mounting a 90mm cannon on the M4 instead of its standard 75mm.\u00a0 However, Lieutenant General McNair, commander of the Army Ground Forces, considered this change unnecessary due to American doctrine which sait that tanks were not to be used to destroy enemy tanks but instead were for exploitation. [4]. \u00a0This pressure caused development of improved tanks to proceed slowly.\u00a0 However, the Ordnance Department continued independent development of a heavy tank carrying the 90mm gun which resulted in the T26-series of heavy tanks [4]. \u00a0This tank was standardized as the M26 Pershing and by the end of the war 200 had been shipped to Europe, though only 20 saw combat.\u00a0 When the war ended the Pershing was re-designated as a medium tank due to changing battlefield doctrine.\u00a0 Due to the Pershing’s roots as a heavy tank, it was under-powered and not well suited to the role as a medium tank.<\/p>\n

While the Pershing was a significant improvement over the Sherman, it weighed significantly more and used the same power-train.\u00a0 In order to improve its performance, the Pershing was upgraded with the chief improvement being a new engine.\u00a0 In addition to improving power, these upgrades improved engine reliability and cooling [8].\u00a0 This upgraded Pershing was renamed the M46 Patton which saw use in the Korean war.\u00a0 However, the in terms of armor and armament the Patton was essentially the same vehicle as the Pershing from WWII.\u00a0 In 1946, work began on a successor to the M46, the T42.\u00a0 However, due to the ongoing demobilization, work was slow until the Korean war broke out in 1950.\u00a0 At that time the T42’s turret carried an improved 90mm gun and was better armored compared to the M46. \u00a0In addition it carried a stereoscopic range finder which had the potential to allow a better chance of a hit on the first shot. \u00a0The T42’s engine however was unsatisfactory and underpowered [5]. \u00a0With the war providing a strong need for a new design, the turret of the T42 was mounted on the hull of the M46 resulting in the M47 Patton.\u00a0 The M47 entered production in 1952 after a short testing period of testing, however, teething issues prevented it from entering active service during the war. \u00a0The primary cause of these issues was the rangefinder which was complex and to fragile for use in a battlefield, in addition the turret control system frequently malfunctioned [5].\u00a0 While these problems were eventually corrected, the M47 Patton was replaced by the M48 Patton in US service before it ever got to the front.<\/p>\n

From the beginning the US Army recognized the M47 was less than ideal and never intended it as anything more than a stop gap measure.\u00a0 In 1950, while the M47 was being built, work started on an entirely new tank, which was developed into the M48 Patton.\u00a0 This tank was tested in 1952 and was a significant improvement over the M47.\u00a0 The M48 was a significant improvement over the M47, with improvements across the board.\u00a0 Its turret was more efficiently shaped allowing for better protection from incoming fire.\u00a0 It had a smaller four-man crew, and wider tracks, ensuring better traction and better distributing the weight of the tank to prevent it from sinking into mud.\u00a0 Additionally, the M48 fitted a much more powerful engine, providing better mobility.\u00a0 One of the most significant improvements was the addition of a mechanical fire control computer.\u00a0 This device calculated the range to target and elevated the gun based on range vehicle tilt and ammunition type, permitting engagements at much longer ranges than before.<\/p>\n

Tanks in the Korean War<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cOn the eve of the Korean War, the Army had approximately 3,400 M24 [Chaffee] light tanks in the inventory, most of them unserviceable. In addition, there were available approximately 3,200 M4A3E8 Sherman medium tanks of World War II vintage, of which only a few more than half were serviceable\u201d [8].\u00a0 These tanks were holdovers from WWII and neither had been able to go head to head with a German tank, relying instead on numbers and tactics.\u00a0 However, at the start of the war these where the only tanks available for use in Korea, with the exception of a few M26 Pershings which were rushed over and suffered engine issues.\u00a0 While the M46 soon arrived, large numbers of Shermans and Chaffees remained on the front.\u00a0 During the Korean war the main adversary US tanks saw was the Russian made T-34.\u00a0 According to Thompson, who wrote about the war as it was happening, \u201cthe [M46] Patton, with a high velocity 90mm gun, was a match for the Russian made World War II T-34, while the lighter medium, the Sherman, with a souped up 76mm gun, was not quite in theT-34 class\u201d [2]. \u00a0Despite its seeming inferiority however, the Sherman still found use, in part because it was smaller and could more easily handle tight terrain and soft ground.\u00a0 One of the largest factor in how tanks perform is the way in which they are deployed. \u00a0\u201cIn the beginning, the Korean War was a war of movement. U.S. tank units were assigned to various infantry divisions, regimental combat teams, and task forces for mobile fire support and antitank capabilities\u201d [8].\u00a0 However, when the Chinese and North Korean forces pushed back the war took on a much more defensive role for the US forces.<\/p>\n

The war in which these tanks were used was different from the European war they were designed for.\u00a0 As Thompson stated, \u201cthere are few open areas where the tanks can be used en masse, and there have been no tank battles such as occurred on the Russian front or the western front in Europe.\u00a0 But in supporting infantry, tanks have been a good weapon against fortifications and on river crossings\u201d [2].\u00a0 Furthermore, the tanks had difficulty with the mountainous terrain and wet ground of Korea.\u00a0 Despite this, US tanks found uses primarily as infantry support. \u00a0In Thompson’s words, \u201cour own tanks, including Pattons, Shermans, and the light Chaffe with a 75 mm gun, have all been used in supporting roles which would look very strange to most tankers.\u00a0 While the ground was hard, we shoved tanks up mountain sides, as well as across rice fields.\u00a0 From mountain crests they fired into the enemy log bunkers\u201d [2].\u00a0 This is a significant departure from the traditional role of the tank in combat.\u00a0 While tanks have always supported infantry, usually the role of the medium tank is to break through enemy lines.\u00a0 Instead, Thompson describes tanks purely in the infantry support role.\u00a0 In fact, most tanks were used for indirect fire or used as fixed bunkers.\u00a0 After war analysis would show that this strategy worked and that the US tanks were about three times as effective as those fielded by the Koreans [8].<\/p>\n

M47 details<\/strong><\/p>\n

The following information about the M47 Patton comes primarily from the tank manual and is may be interesting to some:<\/p>\n

The Patton was 23 feet long by 11.5 feet wide and 9.6 feet tall, under combat load it weighed 48.6 tons.\u00a0 While this was significantly larger and heavier than the WWII era M4 Sherman, it was not much more than the M26 Pershing or the immediately preceding M46 Patton.\u00a0 The tank was powered by a 12-cylinder Continental Engine which produced over 810 hp resulting in 16.6 hp\/ton resulting in a fair degree of mobility.<\/p>\n

In terms of armor, the M47 had 4 inches of armor in the front of the hull set at a 60-degree angle.\u00a0 Because of this angle the armors effective thickness was doubled resulting in an effective 8 inches of frontal hull armor.\u00a0 The front of the turret also had 4 inches of steel armor but was not angled as sharply at only 40 degrees for an effective thickness of 5.2 inches.<\/p>\n

The M47’s 90mm gun could fire many types of ammunition, from armor piercing (AP) to high explosive (HE), and more expensive discarding sabot (AP-DS) and anti-tank shaped charges (HEAT).\u00a0 The gun could also fire a selection of smoke and marker shells.\u00a0 In addition to the primary gun the M47 also had two .50 caliber machine guns on in the hull and one on the turret.<\/p>\n

\"\"
Schematic of the M47 Patton as seen in the tanks Manual. Picture taken from the AFV Database.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Despite the fact that the M47 Patton was a stopgap measure and was replaced before it ever saw combat, it was an important part of American tank design and lead to many other tank designs. \u00a0The tank was designed in an era where the design of armored vehicles was changing to adapt to new technologies and contained man holdovers to older designs. \u00a0One example of this is the five man crew. \u00a0At the same time the M47 contained features which were new to American design, such as the turret which was shaped in a way to better prevent shells from penetrating it. \u00a0Its immidiate predecessor, the M48 Patton, was used in the Korean War and was a vast improvement over the tanks in the American arsinal at the time.<\/p>\n\n

Primary Sources<\/strong><\/p>\n

    \n
  1. (1953, Jun 1). \u201cARMY’S NEW MEDIUM TANK,\u201d Chicago Daily Tribune (1923-1963)<\/em><\/a><\/li>\n
  2. Thompson, John H (1951). \u201cKorean War Shows New Weapon Needs: Korean War,\u201d Chicago Daily Tribune<\/em><\/a><\/li>\n
  3. United States, Department of the Army (1952). TM 9-718A 90-mm Gun Tank M47.<\/em><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Secondary Sources<\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
    1. Cameron, Robert S. (1997). \u201cArmor combat development 1917-1945,\u201d Armor<\/em> 106.5: 14-19.<\/a><\/li>\n
    2. Cameron, Robert S. (1998). \u201cAmerican tank development during the Cold War,\u201d Armor<\/em> 107.4: 30-36.<\/a><\/li>\n
    3. Conners Chris (2015). “90mm Gun Tank M47 Patton 47,”\u00a0AFV Database<\/i><\/a><\/li>\n
    4. Fletcher, S H (1954). \u201cArms for the Assault,\u201d Marine Corps Gazette<\/em> 38.7: 22-28.<\/a><\/li>\n
    5. Hofmann, George F. (2000). \u201cTanks and the Korean War: A case study of unpreparedness,\u201d Armor<\/em> 109.5: 7-12.<\/a><\/li>\n
    6. Olinger, Mark A (1997). \u201cToo late for the war,\u201d Armor <\/em>106.3: 15-17.<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      Further Reading<\/strong><\/p>\n